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[S. F. No. 18366. In Bank. Mar. 25, 1952.]
STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND et al.,
Petitioners, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION, PAUL J. HULL, Respondents.
[1] Workmen's Compensation-Compensable Injuries-Injuries In-

flicted by Foreman.-An employee who was injured in a fight
with his foreman in which he was the aggressor and which
occurred during the course of the employment is entitled to
workmen's compensation for such injuries. (Disapproving,
Globe Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 193 Cal. 470
[225 P. 273] and Globe Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com.,
2 Cal.2d 8 [37 P.2d 1039].)
PROCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial Accident Commission awarding compensation for personal injuries.
A ward affirmed.
Donald Gallagher and Royle A. Carter for Petitioners.
Edmund J. Thomas, Jr., T. Groezinger, Robert Ball, P. H.
McCarthy, Jr., F. Nason O'Hara, Herbert S. Johnson and
Alfred C. Skaife for Respondents.
CARTER, J.-Compensation was awarded to Paul J. Hull
under the workmen's compensation law. The employer and
his insurance carrier seek to have the award annulled.
Hull was employed as an oiler on road construction work
west of Woodland, California. He had been working about
three and a half days with an outfit of which William Hoover
was foreman. While they were at work Hoover walked past
Hull to a truck driver and directed the latter to tell Hull to
help load a caterpillar. Hull received confirmation of the
order by calling across to Hoover. Later Hull approached
Hoover and inquired why he didn't give him a direct order
instead of relaying it through the truck driver. Hoover
asked, "What's the matter, don't you like your job?" Hull
said he didn't mind the job, but he wanted to be talked to as
man to man. Asked if he wanted to quit, Hull said he did
[1] See Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation,§ 80; Am.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 266.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1] Workmen's Compensation, § 95.
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not, but thought ''it was a ~
' to give an order after~
walking past him face to face. According to Hoover, Hull
called him a bad name. Hoover told him he'd better take
off his glasses if he was going to talk like that, to which Hull
replied that he didn't need to remove them, and he "swung"
at Hoover. He "missed" but a fight ensued in which he was
hit several times by Hoover. He received injuries which incapacitated him for a period of about 10 days and required
medical treatment and dental work.
The commission's first order was a denial of compensation
based on the finding that Hull was the aggressor in the fight.
A petition for rehearing was granted by the commission to
reconsider whether Hull was the aggressor and if so, whether
an aggressor injured in an argument arising out of the
employment was entitled to an award of compensation under
the workmen's compensation law of this state. In its order
on rehearing the commission found that Hull sustained injury occurring in the course of and arising out of the employment in an altercation in which he was the aggressor.
An award of $8.57 temporary disability and an additional
award to cover the cost of medical and dental treatment
followed.
The petitioners challenge the validity of the award on the
ground that it is contrary to the decisions of the Industrial
Accident Commission from the beginning of operation of the
governing law in this state and contrary to definite intimations of this court in harmony with the decisions of the cornmission. The respondents concede that their present position
is contrary to former decisions of the commission and of state:p:Ients of this court, but they assert that "the modern trend"
in industrial accident cases is to award compensation "irrespective of fault'' and that although an aggressor may be at
fault he is nevertheless entitled to compensation.
[1] The workmen's compensation law as declared in the
Constitution and statutes compels affirmance of the award.
The Constitution confers upon the Legislature power to
establish a system of workmen's compensation and create
and enforce a liability on employers to compensate their
workmen for injury sustained in the course of their employment "irrespective of the fwult of any party.'' (Italics
added.) (Cal. Const., art. XX, § 21.) The only requirements of the statute are, that to be compensable, an injury
must "arise out of" and "occur in the course of" the employment. (Lab. Code, § 3600.) That is to say the employee
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must be engaged in some activity growing out of and incidental to his employment at the time he suffers an injury in
order to be entitled to compensation under the workmen's
compensation law. It cannot be doubted that a dispute between an employee and his superior in regard to the latter's
treatment of the former in their relations as boss and worker
is incidental to the employment. There is no doubt that the
injury occurred in the course of the employment, for that
has reference ordinarily to time and place. Hull has satisfied
both aspects. The crucial issue is whether it "arose out of" the
employment, and that poses the question of whether there is
a causal connection between the employment and the injury.
That that is the only issue follows from the Workmen's Compensation Act which excludes fault and contributory negligence of the employee and assumption of risk as defenses.
That is the express declaration of the Constitution and statutes relating to workmen's compensation. Indeed the statute
compels that result inasmuch as it declares that "serious
and wilful misconduct'' on the part of the employee does not
defeat his recovery; it merely cuts it in half, and not even
that under certain conditions (Lab. Code, § 4551), thus indicating clearly that misconduct on his part is not a defense.
Hence the charge of aggressor cannot be a defense, for it is
nothing more than an assertion that the employee was at fault
-was to blame-brought it on himself.
These principles, including the negation of a requirement
that the employee is doing something for his employer's benefit, were clearly stated by this court in the recent case of
Pacific Emp. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 26 Cal.2d 286
[158 P.2d 9, 159 A.L.R. 313], where we abandoned the long
standing rule in this state that the victim of "horseplay" was
not entitled to compensation. The logic of that case is here
compelling. We said: "As grounds for annulling the award,
the insurer contends that, although the applicant's injury
occurred in the course of her employment, it did not arise
'out of' her employment and, accordingly, is not a compensable injury within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Accident
Commission. . . . 'It is not indispensable to recovery, however, that the employee be rendering a service to Ms employer
at the time of the in.ft[ry. [Citations.] The essential prerequisite to compensation is that danger from which the in.inry results be one to which he is exposed as an employee in
his particular employment.' , , . The petitioner concedes

662

STATE CoMP. INs. FuND v. IND. Ace. CoM.

[38 C.2d

that if skylarking was customary and condoned by the employer . . . or if, under similar circumstances, Miss Carmel
had been injured through an altercation between fellow employees over their work . . . she would be entitled to compensation. These judicial distinctions lack realism. . . . Certainly, a classification of assattlts and altercations as incidental
to employment, bttt placing accidents caused by playfulness
and frolicking, in which the injured employee took no part
and of which he had no knowledge, in the category of those
not 'proximately caused by the employment,' has no sound
basis in law or in fact. . . . Considering, as we may, the
propensities and tendencies of mankind and the ordinary
habits of life, it must be admitted that wherever human
beings congregate, either at work or at play, there is some
frolicking and horseplay. Accordingly, an injury sustained
by a nonparticipating employee through the horseplay of
fellow workers arises 'out of' and 'is proximately caused by
the employment' within the meaning of section 3600 of the
Labor Code." (Italics added.) More recently this court
dealt with the question of whether on the basis of respondeat
superior an employer was liable for an assault by his employee
on another workman, although he was the aggressor. In Carr
v. Wm. C. C1·owell Co., 28 Cal.2d 652 [171 P.2d 5], the employee, following a dispute over work, threw a hammer and
struck plaintiff with it. Plaintiff was another workman but
not for the same employer. It was held that the assault was
in the course of the employment, for it arose out of a dispute
about the work being performed. We said: "Defendant contends that Enloe was not acting in the scope of his employment when he injured plaintiff, on the grounds that the throwing of the hammer did not further defendant's interests as
an employer and that Enloe could not have intended by his
conduct to further such interests. It is sufficient, however, if
the injtlry resulted from a dispute arising out of the employment. Under the provisions of section 2338 of the Civil Code
a principal is liable for 'wrongful acts' of his agent committed
'in and as a part of' the principal's business. 'It is not
necessary that the assault should have been made "as a means,
or for the purpose of performing the work he (the employee)
was employed to do." ' ... Such associations 'include the
faults and derelictions of human beings as well as their virtues and obediences. Men do not discard their personal qualities when they go to work. Into the job they carry their intelligence, skill, habits o~ care and rectitude. Just as inevi-
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tably they take along also their tendencies to carelessness
and camaraderie, as well as emotional make-up. In bringing
men together, work brings these qualities together, causes
frictions between them, creates occasions for lapses into carelessness, and for fun-making and emotional flare-up. Work
could not go on if men became automatons repressed in every
natural expression. . . . These expressions of human nature
are incidents inseparable from working together. They involve risks of injury and these risks are inherent in the, working environment.' (Hartford Ace. & Indern. Co. v. Cardillo,
72 App.D.C. 52 [112 F.2d 11, 15] .) " (Italics added.) Certainly if for the purposes of respondeat superior an employee
is acting within the scope of his employment when committing an assault arising from a dispute as to his work because
it is incidental to employment, it must follow that an injury
he sustains while committing the assault is also within the
course of his employment and incidental to it and compensable,
especially when we remember that the workmen's compensation laws must be liberally construed in favor of the employee. (Lab. Code, § 3202.) The Carr case was followed by
Fields v. Sanders, 29 Cal.2d 834 [180 P.2d 684, 172 A.L.R.
525], where the employer was held liable for an assault by
his truck driver employee resulting from an altercation following a collision. We held the assault to be in the scope
of the employment.
It should be noted that in the Carr case the court cited and
quoted with approval from Hartford Ace. & Indern Co. v.
Cardillo, 72 App.D.C. 52 [112 F.2d 11], cert. den. 310 U.S.
649 [60 S.Ct. 1100, 84 L.Ed. 1415] (see portion of Carr case
last quoted above). The Hartford case was written by Judge
Rutledge, later an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States, and involved the issue of whether an employee who was assaulted because of vile language he used
arising out of a work dispute could recover workmen's compensation under the Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act. The court in an illuminating discussion
held he could, stating: "No common denominator for the cases
can be found in the nature of the specific act or event which
is the immediate cause of the injury. Whether it is 'natural'
or abnormal, occurs on or off the employer's premises, consists in the action of physical or human agencies and, if the
latter, is reflex or volitional, lawful or unlawful, by one deranged or responsible, the common element is to be found in
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a broader and more fundamental principle. It is stated by
Cardozo, J., in Leonbruno v. Champlain Si[k Mills (1920),
229 N.Y. 4 70 [128 N.E. 711, 13 A.L.R. 522], as follows: 'The
claimant was injured, not merely while he was in a factory,
but because he was in a factory, in touch with associations and
conditions inseparable from factory life.' Not the particular
or peculiar character of the associations and conditions, but
that the work creates and surrounds the employee with them
is the basic thing.
"Nor is it necessary, as these cases show, that the particular
act or event which is the immediate cause of the injury be
itself a part of any work done for the employer by the claimant or others. Otherwise no award could be given for many
injuries now compensated, such as those caused by stray bullets, unexplained falls, objects falling from outside the employer's premises and work, many street risks, horseplay, most
assaults and many other causes. 'The risks of injury incurred
in the crowded contacts of the factory through the acts of
fellow workmen are not measured by the tendency of such
acts to serve the master's business.' Not that the act is in the
line of duty, or forwards the work, or creates special risk,
but that the work brings the employee within its peril makes
it, for purposes of compensation, 'part of the work.'
''Recognition that this is so came more easily as to physical
than as to human forces. As with street risks, the early disposition in cases of human action was to emphasize the particular act and its nature, except anomalously when it involved merely negligence of the claimant or fellow employees.
The statutory abolition of common law defenses made easy
recognition of the accidental character of negligent acts by
the claimant and fellow servants. The extension to their
accidental (i.e., non-culpable, but injurious) behavior was
not difficult. So with that of strangers, including assault by
deranged persons, and their negligence intruding into the
working environment. But these extensions required a shift
in the emphasis from the particular act and its tendency to
forward the work to its part as a factor in the general working environment. The shift involved recognition that the
environment includes associations as well as conditions, and
that associations include the faults and derelictions of human
beings as well as their virtues and obediences. Men do not
discard their personal qualities when they go to work. Into
the job they carry their intelligence, skill, habits of care and
rectitude. Just as inevitably they take along also their ten-

Mar. 1952]

STATE Co111P. INs. FUND v. IND. Ace. Co111:.

665

[38 C.2d 659; 242 P.2d 311]

dencies to carelessness and camaraderie, as well as emotional
make-up. In bring,ing rnen togethe1·, work brings these qualities together, causes {rict1:ons between thern, creates occasions
for lapses into carelessness, and fm· fun-making and emotional
flare-up. Work could not go on if men became automatons
repressed in every natural expression. 'Old Man River' is a
part of loading steamboats. 'I'hese expressions of human
nature are incidents inseparable from working together. They
involve risks of injury and these risks are inherent in the
working environment.
"But resistance to application of the broad and basic principle has been most obstinate perhaps where the particular
act immediately causing injury involves responsible volition
by the claimant or others. The extreme instances are those
containing an element of illegality or criminality. The horseplay and assault cases are illustrative. Confusion and conflict
still reign in these realms.
''Several factors have sustained the resistance. One is the
hangover from common law conceptions of profiting by one's
own wrong. But this applies as well, in logic, to contributory
or one's own exclusive negligence. Another was the now
thoroughly dissipated notion that voluntary responsible action cannot be accidental. The volitional character of the
act also raised a supposed analogy to 'independent, intervening agency' in tort causation. There was, further, an assumed essential opposition between 'personal' acts and those
of an 'official' (i.e., related to the work) character. An assault necessarily involves emotional make-up and disturbance.
In a broad sense nothing is more personal. Quarreling is
always so. This accounts for the early disposition to regard
all injuries from wilful assault as not compensable, a view
also necessarily dictated, except rarely when duty requires
fighting, if tendency of the particular act to forward the
work or direct connection with line of duty are the tests of
liability. But that view now is repudiated nniversally in
recognition that work causes quarrels and :fights. That they
involve volition and fault, have no tendency to forward the
work, and are per·rneated with the personal element of anger
no longer suffices to break the causal connect?:on between work
and injury. Emotional disturbance is not of itself an 'independent, intervening cause' or a 'departure from the work.'
''But differences remain as to when work causes quarrels.
So long as the claimant is merely the victim, not a participant,
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it makes little difference whether the fighting is by fellow
employees or strangers to the work or what is the immediate
occasion for the dispute. The same is true in horseplay. It
is sufficient that the work brings the claimant within the range
of peril by requiring his presence there when it strikes. But
conflict becomes acute when the claimant participates. There
are two lines of division, which partially overlap. One is
concerned with whether the claimant is the aggressor. Another turns on whether the dispute arises immediately over
the work or about something else. One view limits compensable causation to quarrels relating directly to the work. It
disconnects the precipitating incident from the working environment, though that alone may have produced it. So isolated, its immediate relevance to the work becomes the determinative consideration. Momentary lapses from duty, as in
horseplay, kidding and teasing, which often explode into
bursts of temper and fighting become 'departures from the
work,' 'independent, intervening causes' or 'purely personal
matters.' Their immediate irrelevance overcomes and nullifies the part played by the work in bringing the men to~
gether and creating the occasion for the lapse or outburst.
The other view rejects the test of immediate relevancy of the
culminating incident. That is regarded, not as an isolated
event, but as part and parcel of the working environment,
whether related directly to the job or to something which is
a by-product of the association. This view recognizes that
work places men under strains and fatigue from human and
mechanical impacts, creating frictions which explode in myriads of ways, only some of which are immediately relevant
to their tasks. Personal animosities are created by working
together on the assembly or in traffic. Others initiated outside the job are magnified to the breaking point by its compelled contacts. No worker is immune to these pressures
and impacts upon temperament. They accumulate and explode over incidents trivial and important, personal and official. But the explosion point is merely the culmination of the
antecedent pressures. That it is not relevant to the immediate task, involves a lapse from duty, or contains an element
of volition or illegality does not disconnect it from them nor
nullify their causal effect 1:n producing its injttrious consequences. Any other view wmtld reintrodtwe the conceptions of
contributory fattlt, action in the line of duty, nonaccidental
character of voltmtary conduct, and independent, intervening
cause as applied in tort law, which it was the purpose of the
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statute to d!iscard. It would require the application of different basic tests of liability for injuries caused by volitional
conduct of the claimant and those resulting from negligent
action, mechanical causes and the volitional activities of
others.
''The limitation, of course, is that the accumulated pressures
must be attributable in substantial part to the working environment. '-l'his implies that their causal effect shall not be
overpowered and nullified by influences originating entirely
outside the working relation and not substantially magnified
by it. Whether such influences have annulling effect upon
those of the environment ordinarily is the crucial issue. The
difference generally is as to the applicable standard. It is
not, as is frequently assumed, the law of 'independent, intervening agency' applied in tort cases. It cannot be prescribed
in meticulous detail, but is set forth in the statute, not only
in the broad presumptions created in favor of compensability,
but more explicitly in the provision by which Congress has
expressed clearly its intention concerning the kinds of acts
which bar recovery when done by the claimant. The provision is: 'No compensation shall be payable if the injury was
occasioned solely by the intoxication of the employee or by the
willful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself or
another.' (Italics supplied.)
''This provision, reinforced by the statutory presumptions
and the Act's fundamental policy in departing from fault
as the basis of liability and of defense, except as specified, is
inconsistent with any notion that recovery is barred by misconduct which amounts to no more than temporary lapse from
duty, conduct immediately irrelevant to the job, contributory negligence, fault, illegality, etc., unless it amounts to the
kind and degree of misconduct prescribed in definite terms
by the Act. · It is entirely inconsi,stent with reading into the
statute the law of tort ca~~sation and defense, where liability
is predicated on fault and nullified by contributory fault.''
(Italics added.)
The modern trend is in accord. (Stark v. State Ind. Ace.
Corn., 103 Ore. 80 [204 P. 151] ; St~r.lginski v. Watorbury Roll·ing lJilills Co., 124 Conn. 355 [199 A. 653] ; Commissioner of
Taxation & Finance v. Bronx Hospital, 276 App.Div. 708
[97 N.Y.S.2d 120]; Dillon's Case, 324 Mass. 102 [85 N.E.2d
69] ; see cases collected 41 ·m.L.Rev. 354-363; Forty Years of
American Workmen's Compensation, Stefan A. Riesenfeld,
Professor of Law, University of Minnesota (1951), 35 Minn.L.
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.Many writers on the subject have taken the

(AssauUs and Horseplay under Workmen's
Compensation Laws, Samuel B. Horovitz, 41 Ill.L.Rev. 311;

r:a.me position

Current Trends in vVorkmen's Compensation, Samuel B. Horovitz (1947), p. 532.) In the above writings .Mr. Horovitz ably
presents the problem. At page 343 et seq. of 41 Ill.L.Rev. he
says : ''Why should it make any legal difference under the
compensation law whether the injured party was the aggressor? Certainly, no compensation statute expressly gives
the employer the defense of 'aggressor.'
''Is there some good reason why so many courts, without
knowing exactly why they do it, deny recovery to all types of
aggressors~ Where the aggression is deliberate and by murderous means, the reason is apparent. Assume that a quarrel
starts on .Monday over work tools. Tuesday one employee,
still angered over that argument, steals up on the other and
attempts to kill him with a hatchet, and instead trips and injures himself, or is killed by the intended victim in self-defense. The quarrel having its origin in a fight over tools,
arises out of the employment.
''If he is to be denied compensation, it must, therefore, be
on some other ground. .Most acts supply that ground, by
expressly providing that there shall be no recovery where the
claimant is guilty of serious and wilful misconduct, or of
wilful intention to injure or kill himself or another, or similar
enactments. Certainly a deliberate hatchet-murder, attempted
the following day when the excuse of high passion is gone,
falls within the express exception, and no recovery is possible.
"But no such wilful intention or wilful misconduct can
be spelled out of every aggressive act. A playful push, an
angry curse, or even an impulsive punch with a fist is not
what legislatures intended to punish, by depriving workers of
compensation. And the burden of proof of such serious and
wilful misconduct, or wilful intention to injure or any similar
defense, is upon the employer or insurer. Where the board,
commission or court does not expressly find such violation,
what right has the court to read in a new exception for
'aggressors'? Why rule out negligence, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, etc., in all other types of compensation cases, and leave it in for assaults~
"Wilful misconduct or wilful intention to injure another
usually denotes premeditated or deliberate misconduct. Serious and wilful misconduct does not cover misconduct which
is trivial, no matter how grave the result, or misconduct which
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is not intentional, e. g., misconduct which is impulsive, or inadvertent, or thoughtless, or as the result of an instinctive
act . . . .
"Many assaults result from impulsive, thoughtless or unintentional acts, often trivial in origin, although the result
may be serious or even fatal. The 'explosive point is merely
the culmination of antecedent pressures' in many instances.
A worker tells his foreman he wishes to quit the gang and
that the foreman is prejudiced against him. One word leads
to another, and fists fly. To create an artificial rttle that he
whose fist first made contact is an aggressor (and can never
recover, even though the first fist did no harm, whereas the
second fist permanently injured the fellow worker), is to
forget the legislative cornmand that injuries arising out of
the employment be compensated, short of wilful misconduct
or similar provisions. And where the quarrel had its origin
in the work or work-environment and was short of wilful
misconduct, or short of any express defense in the act, how
can the court justify their own judicially-created defenses?
How are they justified in bringing into the compensation
act the discarded principles of the common law as to contributory fault, independent intervening cause, and the like~ That
these tort theories have been discarded is too well recognized
for further modern argument. That there is a natural repugnancy to help a guilty party is no excuse for relieving
industry of a liability and placing it on the worker or charity.
"The moment courts properly admit that, for the nonaggressor, an assault, malicious or sportive, arises out of the
employment, that the same assault necessarily arises out of the
ernployment for the aggressor. It is the characte1· and nature
of the assault which determines whether it arises out of the
employment, not the culpability or lack of culpability of the
parties involved. It is the assault itself which arises out of
the employment). and who initiates the altercation has no
bearing on that question, relates to common law culpability
eonsioerations. and is of importance only in considering the
leqislative defense of wilful misconduct and the Wee."
(Italics added.)
·
Mr. William R. Schneider, in analyzing the cases states that
the weight of authority supports the propositions that (1) assaults arising out of controversies over the manner and method
of performing work are compensable as a general proposition,
but may not be if the injured employee initiated the assault.
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(2) Those arising from personal animosity are not. (3) the
aggressor in the assault may not recover. (Schneider, Workmen's Compensation rrext [Perm. ed.] § 1560.) There is no
basis for distinguishing between the case where the employee
initiated the assault and where he did not or that of an aggressor and nonaggressor, except in one the employee is at
fault and in the other he is not. As seen, this cannot be a valid
distinction, because the fault of the employee is no bar to
recovery unless it is serious and wilful misconduct and then
only to the extent of one half the compensation, and not at
all if the employee is killed, suffers 70 per cent or more disability, was under 16 years of age, or the employer failed to
comply with a safety regulation. (Lab. Code, § 4551.)
The contention is made that considerations· of public policy
require that recovery be denied in cases where the employee
is injured while engaged in the violation of a penal statute,
because, to allow recovery in such a case, would permit a person to benefit by his own wrong. That appears to be the real
basis of many of the decisions denying recovery. The effect
of such a holding is to deny recovery because of the fault of
the employee contrary to the express provisions of the Constitution and statutes relating to workmen's compensation.
The question of policy is for the people and the Legislature
in the first instance and here they have spoken in no uncertain language, saying that fault, serious and wilful misconduct, and contributory negligence do not bar recovery. Hence
to the extent such action by the employee is within a "wrong"
by which he may not ordinarily benefit, the policy declared is
that he may so benefit.
In the same connection, fear has been expressed that workmen will receive compensation for injuries suffered while
committing a serious crime and who may be imprisoned for
the offense. This fear is unfounded. Situations are conceivable where all would probably agree that compensation should
be awarded even though a crinie was committed. Take the
case where an employee is injured while driving a car with
defective brakes or without lights at night while engaged in
conducting his employer's business or is required to make fast
deliveries and so operates it that he is guilty of speeding,
reckless driving, or even manslaughter. There may be cases
in which a crime (e. g., murder) is committed where the criminal act may not be said to be reasonably related to the employment-is not within the realm of those acts which may
arise out of emotional conflicts engendered by frictions in
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employment. When such a case is presented it can be decided
on its facts without violating sound rules of construction of
the constitutional and statutory provisions relating to workmen's compensation. Rather than attempt to state a general
rule with exact boundaries, the court should meet each case
as it arises. Clearly, a simple assault, such as here involved
is not outside the boundary or in the category of an act having no reasonable connection with the employment.
The dictum contrary to the foregoing in Globe Indemnity
Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 193 Cal. 470 [225 P. 273] and
Globe Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 2 Ca1.2d 8 [37
P.2d 1039], is disapproved.
The award is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., and Traynor, J., concurred.
Edmonds, J., concurred in the judgment.
SHENK, J.-1 dissent. The crucial issue is conceded to be
whether the injury "arose out of" the employment. The
majority assumes to settle the question by the observation that
the Constitution declares that injury so sustained shall be
deemed compensable" irrespective of the fault of any party";
that since aggression is fault, it is therefore not a defense.
This oversimplified solution is contrary to established state
policy and decisional law.
The holding in Pacific Emp. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace.
Com., 26 Cal.2d 286 [158 P.2d 9, 159 .A.L.R. 313], does not
sustain the proposition. As the majority opinion points out,
the court there abandoned the long existing rule that the nonparticipating "victim" of horseplay was not entitled to compensation. Here we are dealing with the aggressor, not his
victim. Nor is reference to the result under the doctrine of
respondeat superior in point. There again the injuries to
another person are involved. In my opinion the words "without the fault of any party" apply, as the Constitution indicates, after it is determined that the injury arises out of the
employment. .As the opinion concedes, an aggressive act has
not uniformly been deemed to be an act coupled with and
therefore arising out of employment. On the contrary the
weight of authority has supported and still supports the view
that an aggressor has stepped aside from his employment and
at least as to his own injuries is not within the purview of the
compensation acts.
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It is true that the salutary provisions of workmen's compensation laws in this state and elsewhere generally have
abolished the rule of assumption of risk, the fellow servant
doctrine and contributory negligence as defenses in proceedings in behalf of an injured workman. But it does not follow
that all other defenses have been abolished.
Regardless of the seemingly broad and all-inclusive language of our constitutional provision as an enabling act,
it has always been recognized that certain facts must be established and conditions found to exist before the compensation law may be invoked. It is essential that the relationship
of employer and employee be present at the time of the injury.
It is also essential that the injuries must have been sustained
by the worlnn.en ''in the course of their employment.''
( Const., art. XX, § 21.) In the exercise of its plenary power
the Legislature has imposed other conditions on the right
of an employee to receive compensation from his employer.
Section 3600 of the Labor Code requires (a) that both the
employer and the employee be subject to the compensation
provisions of the code; (b) that, at the time of the injury,
the employee be performing services growing out of and incidental to his employment and be acting within the course
of his employment; (c) that the injury be proximately caused
by the employment, either with or without negligence; (d)
that the injury be not caused by the intoxication of the injured employee; or (e) that the injury be not intentionally
self-inflicted.
The incidents of employment relationship and "course of
employment" requirements of subdivisions (a), (b) and (c)
cannot be seriously questioned; and the prohibitions against
compensation, notwithstanding the concurrence of all other
requirements, contained in subdivisions (d) and (e) have
never been successfully attacked.
Furthermore section 4551 of the Labor Code denies compensation as to one half where the employee is guilty of serious and wilful misconduct.
No one may rightfully question the power of the Legislature to place proper restrictions on the right to compensation subject of course to the constitutional provisions. Whether
an ''aggressor'' should be entitled to compensation and the
extent if any to which he may be so entitled is a question
of public policy, a subject on which the Legislature might
well provide appropriate regulations. The fact that it has
not done so may be accounted for by the fact that in the
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history of the interpretation of the applicable law in this
state both by decisions of the commission and by language of
this court, the rule has invariably been to deny compensation
to the "aggressor" in assault cases.
In view of that history, interpretation and long standing
public policy, it is not the province of this court to lay down
a rule that an aggressor should be entitled to compensation
under any and all circumstances. The offense might be of
such a nature as to exclude the conduct of the aggressoremployee from consideration as action within the course of
his employment. Such conduct might be in violation of some
penal law of the state involving conduct malttm in se and of
the most flagrant nature. It might even result in murder.
In such a case, if the commission's position be sustained, the
perpetrator of the crime could be receiving compensation
while confined in state's prison for the offense. Liberal construction of compensation laws should not go the length now
established by the majority decision as the policy of the state
that an aggressor should receive compensation benefits. It
certainly should not be the rule that an employee committing
a criminal assault on another should be deemed to be acting
for his employer for the purpose of collecting from him compensation for injuries which he sustained as a result of his
own criminal act. Whether the aggressor-employee's conduct
would constitute such a penal offense as to entitle him to or
exclude him from compensation should be determined in
accordance with some legislative guide. If the acts of the
aggressor-employee amount to serious and wilful misconduct
compensation to the extent of one half may in a proper case
be awarded as provided by section 4551 of the Labor Code.
But it has never been held that regardless of the seriousness
of the offense, the offender is entitled to compensation-one
half or at all.
The decisions of the commission which have denied compensation to the aggressor, with the sole exception of the order
on rehearing in this proceeding, include the following: Hemphill v. Industrial Ace. Com., 20 I.A.C. 110; Sosson v. Industrial Ace. Com., 17 LA. C. 120; Turner v. Industrial Ace. Com.,
17 I.A.O. 119; McGttirk v. Frank J. Klimm Co., 17 I.A.O. 12;
Wilson v. Carter, 14 I.A.O. 78; Challman v. State Harbor
Commrs., 9 0.0.0. 120; Galpin v. Industrial Ace. Com.,

2 0.0.0. 29.
38 C.2d-U
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Although an aggressor was not directly involved in Giobe
Indemnity Co. v. Ind~tstriai Ace. Corn., 193 Cal. 470 [225 P.
273], and Wobe Indemnity Co. v. IndustTiai Ace. Com., 2 Cal.
2d 8 [37 P.2d 1039], the rule of noncompensability for injuries on behalf of an aggressor established and uniformly
adhered to by the commission was not questioned and was
approved by implication.
Numerous authorities elsewhere disclose the prevailing view
to be that a claimant who is the aggressor in an assault
steps aside from his employment for a purpose of his own
even though the argument which precipitates the assault is
work-incited. Such cases follow the general rule (see note,
112 A.L.R. at page 1270 with citation of cases), that where
the claimant is the aggressor in provoking an assault upon
himself, the injury does not arise out of the employment.
(Vollmer v. City of Milwaukee (1948), 254 Wis. 162 [35 N.W.
2d 304] ; Riley v. I ndustTial 0 orn. ( 1946) , 394 Ill. 126 [ 67
N.E.2d 172]; KimbTo v. Black & White Cab Co. (1934), 50
Ga.App. 143 [177 S.E. 274]; Merkel v. T. A. Gillespie Co.
(1932), 10 N.J.Misc. 1081 [162 A. 250]; Davis v. Robinson,
(1932), 94 Ind.App. 104 [179 N.E. 797, 799-800]; TTiangle
Auto P. & T. Co. v. IndustTial Com. (1931), 346 Ill. 609 [178
N.E. 886] ; cf. Horvath v. LaFond (1943), 305 Mich. 69
[8 N.W.2d 915]; Williams v. Industrial Com. (1939), 63
Ohio App. 66 [25 N.E.2d 313] ; CheTry v. Magnolia Pet. Co.
(Tex.Com.App. 1932), 45 S.W.2d 555; Fttlton Bag & Cotton
Mills v. Haynie (1931), 43 Ga.App. 579 [159 S.E. 781]; Martin v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. (1927), 216 Ala. 500
[113 So. 578]; OuTran v. Vang Canst. Co. (1926), 286 Pa.
245 [133 A. 261]; Stillwagon v. Callan BTos. Inc. (1918),
183 App.Div. 141 [170 N.Y.S. 677]; Griffin v. A. Roberson
& Son (1916), 176 App.Div. 6 [162 N.Y.S. 313, 314] .) Carr
v. Wm. C. Crowell Co., 28 Cal.2d 652 [171 P.2d 5], Fields v.
Sanders, 29 Cal.2d 834 [180 P.2d 684, 172 A.L.R. 525], and
similar cases are consistent with that general rule. Those
cases involve the right of third parties to recover from an
aggressor's employer for injuries inflicted by the aggressor
while acting in the course of his employment. (Of. Hartford
Ace. & Indem. Co. v. CaTdillo (1940), 72 App.D.C. 52 [112
F.2d 11], cert. den. 310 U.S. 649 [60 S.Ct. 1100, 84 L.Ed.
1415] .) In those cases it was not the aggressor-employee who
was seeking recovery of benefits for injuries which he received. Such cases are not in point and should not be considered to have controlling effect here.
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Cases which are said to indicate a "modern trend" to compensate the aggressor for his injuries are conceded in the
majority opinion not to be in accord with the weight of authority. (See Schueller v. Armour & Co. (1935), 116 Pa.
Super. 323, 328 [176 A. 527]; Traders & General Ins. Co. v.
Mills (Tex.Civ.App. 1937), 108 S.W.2d 219, 224; Hartford
Ace.&; Indem. Co. v. Cardillo (1940), 72 App.D.C. 52 [112
F.2d 11], cert. den. 310 U.S. 649 [60 S.Ct. 1100, 84 L.Ed.
1415]; Newell v. Moreau (1947), 94 N.H. 439 [55 A.2d 476,
479-480]; Dillon's Case (1949), 324 Mass. 102 [85 N.E.2d 69,
72] ; Commissioner of Tax. & Fin. v. Bronx Hospital (1950),
276 App.Div. 708 [97 N.Y.S.2d 120, 122-123] ; cf. Stulginski
v. Waterbury Rolling Mills Co. (1938), 124 Conn. 355 [199 A.
653] ; Haas v. B1·otherhood of Trans. Workers (1945), 158
Pa.Super. 291 [44 A.2d 776, 780] ; see cases collected Horovitz article, 41 Ill. Law Rev. 311, at p. 363, n. 170.) The
applicable rule must necessarily depend on the law of the
forum.
Because this court in Pacific Emp. Ins. Co. v. Industrial
Ace. Com., supra, 26 Cal.2d 286, overruled numerous earlier
cases which denied compensation to a nonparticipating employee injured through the horseplay of a fellow worker is
no reason now to disclaim adherence to the cases in this state
which have impliedly approved the general rule heretofore
followed by the commission in aggressor assault cases. The
decision in that case may properly lead to a holding of compensability for injuries suffered by the victim of the aggressor;
but it is not authority for compensating the self-provoked injuries of an aggressor. The risk that an employee may receive
injuries from his own act of aggression should not be considered incidental to his employment. If the rule as heretofore
established in this state is to be relaxed and recovery be authorized under circumstances which do not otherwise offend
the law, the change should be made by the Legislature, not by
the courts. In my opinion the award should be annulled.
Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.

